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Abstract  
 
The absent or poorly functioning risk pooling mechanisms and high amounts of out-
of-pocket payments for health care expose households to financial risks associated with major 
illnesses or accidents. The aim of this paper is to analyse the extent to which out-of-pocket 
health spending impoverish the households in Albania. The study augments the existing 
evidence by analysing the dynamics of such payments over different years and the weight 
that informal payments have in the total out-of-pocket health spending. 
 
The data used in this study come from Albania Living Standard Measurement Survey 
(ALSMS) for 2002, 2005 and 2008. We measure headcount catastrophic payments using 
different thresholds and the decomposition of indicators by expenditure quintiles to 
understand better their effects. We find that out-of-pocket and informal payments have 
increased in real value throughout the years. Even though their catastrophic effect has gone 
down (due also to declining trends in absolute poverty), the effect for the poorest expenditure 
quintiles remains high. Out-of-pocket payments deepen the poverty headcount and also 
enlarge the poverty gap and again the effect is larger for the poorest quintiles.  Future policy 
interventions should provide better protection mechanisms for the poor by providing 
exemption criteria or subsidised transport and should seek to address the widespread informal 
payments in the country.  
 
 
Keywords: catastrophic payments, out-of-pocket payments, impoverishment, Albania LSMS,  
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Introduction 
 
High levels of out-of-pocket payments for health care expose households to financial 
risks associated with major illness (World Bank, 1993, 1995a; WHO 2005). Expecting 
households to make some financial contribution for their health care is reasonable even in 
wealthy countries with sophisticated public and private health insurance, and particularly for 
frequently occurring conditions that are inexpensive to remedy. However, an over reliance on 
out-of-pocket payments for health care may endanger households’ customary standards of 
living and disrupt household welfare (Berki, 1986; O’Donnell et al., 2005 & 2008; Gertler 
and Gruber, 2002; Xu et al., 2003), particularly for serious, less-frequently occurring 
conditions for which the costs of treatment can quickly mount. Households, especially in 
developing countries, may not be able to insure their basic needs (World Bank 1993, 1995a) 
and uninsured health care events can therefore increase the risks of loss of incomes from 
reduced labour supply or lower productivity. This can cause long-term consequences pushing 
them into a “trans-generational cycle” of poverty (Baeza and Packard, 2006). High out-of-
pocket payments for health care can also prevent some people from seeking necessary health 
care creating thus barriers to access for the most poor (Xu et al., 2007).  
 
In essence, health care costs can be considered catastrophic when they force 
individuals or households to significantly decrease their standard of living now or in the 
future (Stiglitz, 1988). A survey of 89 countries has showed that almost 150 million people 
globally suffer financial catastrophe because of high out-of-pocket health care expenditures 
(Xu et al., 2007). Giving that one of the main objectives of health care systems should be 
ensuring the equity among health care seekers, households should be protected against such 
catastrophic medical expenditures (WHO, 2000).  
 
While cross country comparisons show that out-of-pocket payments are prevalent in 
most Western Balkans Countries, recent studies (Bredenkamp et al., 2010) show that 
catastrophic out-of-pocket payments (including informal payments) in Albania are higher 
than in most other countries. When this finding is examined alongside the much larger share 
of out-of-pocket spending in total financing of health in Albania relative to other similar 
countries (like Montenegro, Macedonia or Serbia) (Berdenkamp et al., 2010) and the much 
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higher incidence of informal payments, concern that these payments are further raising 
barriers to care and increasing the financial vulnerability of households grows. 
 
This paper looks at the effect of out-of-pocket and informal payments on household 
expenditures by exploring the existing and the newly available ALSMS (Albania Living 
Standard Measurement Survey) data for 2002, 2005 and 2008. The paper focuses on two 
main aspects of out-of-pocket payments: (i) the incidence and intensity of ‘catastrophic’ 
health care expenditure, and (ii) the effect of out-of-pocket payments on poverty headcount 
and poverty gap measures. The main questions that this paper attempts to answer are: Does 
out-of-pocket health spending impoverish the households in Albania? And what weight do 
informal payments have in increasing the burden of out-of-pocket health spending? The paper 
uses the decomposition of out-of-pocket payments in health care by main expenditure 
quintiles to look at the particular burden for different categories. Further decomposition of 
such payments by main components and public/private sector aims to give a ‘panoramic’ 
picture of the main developments over the years.  
 
Data and methodology  
 
Out-of-pocket expenditures for health care in Albania are assessed in this paper using 
ALSMS data for three different years, 2002, 2005 and 2008. The data are representative for 
Albania and are collected using a similar methodology. However they can only offer cross-
section features and lack the longitudinal dimension. Longitudinal data would be ideally if we 
want to estimate the extent to which living standards are disrupted by the purchase of medical 
care in response to illness shocks (O’Donnell et al., 2008). This allows to see how household 
well-being is affected by certain health shocks (Gertler and Gruber, 2002; Wagstaff, 2007). 
However, as often only cross-section data are available, it has been proposed to define out-of-
pocket payments as catastrophic if they exceed a critical share of households’ resources 
during one year (Berki, 1986; Russell, 2004; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003; Xu et al., 
2003). In this paper we exploit the same definitions used in different ALSMS to compare the 
trends of out-of-pockets and their impoverishing effects over the years. 
 
One of the debatable points in the literature is the choice of the comparators of out-of-
pocket payments (O’Donnell et al., 2008). The two possibilities are to calculate out-of-pocket 
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as a share of household’s income, consumption or expenditure. All measures have advantages 
and disadvantages. Income is often argued to be a better denominator as it is completely 
irresponsive of health care expenditures. However, this advantage is offset by the fact that an 
out-of-pocket-to-income ratio will not account the use of other resources available to some of 
the households and not available to others (e.g. the use of savings). Total expenditures on the 
other hand may be more responsive to health care. For example for the poor households 
resources tend be directed to items that are indispensable (i.e. food). Given this the poorest 
will always tend to spend more on such subsistence items leaving little to health care. One of 
the solutions mentioned in O’Donnell et al. (2008) is to consider catastrophic payments as the 
share of out-of-pocket payments to the non-necessity total expenditures (defined often as the 
expenditure on non-food items). Because of the non-indispensable nature, non-food 
expenditure may distinguish better between the poor and the rich. Given these reasons and 
also the fact that poverty measures in countries like Albania are based primarily on 
expenditures rather than income (World Bank, 2006) we present here the estimated 
catastrophic health payments based on non-health expenditure. To test for the consistency of 
the results when expenditures on non-food items are considered we have also estimated the 
tables for the catastrophic effect of out-of pocket payments on such expenditures (see also 
Table A1 in the appendix). 
 
Health economists have not yet agreed on a uniformly accepted threshold of out-of-
pocket spending that triggers alarm or that unambiguously motivates a policy response. 
Different researchers have used varying thresholds from 5 percent (Berki, 1986), 10 percent 
(Waters et al., 2004) and up to 40 percent when non-subsistence spending is used as a 
denominator (Xu et al., 2003; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003). In order to test the 
sensibility of our estimations we discuss here the results for different thresholds. 
 
Out-of-pocket spending in Albania 
 
Previous work on Albania and other Western Balkan countries has shown that out-of-
pocket payments remain high for most of these countries (Bredenkamp et al., 2010). Such 
spending has been reported to amount to more than 6 % of the per capita expenditures in 
Albania. However, the aggregate figures can only tell about the overall impact of these out-
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of-pocket expenditures. The separate effects of private and public expenditures or formal and 
informal payments over the last years are less known. 
 
Table 1 gives the average per capita expenditures on health and non-health items 
(indexed with 2002 prices). As it can observed the gross per capita expenditures for 
households who have paid out-of-pocket payments have increased in real value during the 
years from 11092 Albanian Leks (ALL)1 in 2002 to 11923 in 2008. This is consistent with 
the decrease in the headcount poverty indexed throughout the same years (INSTAT, 2009). 
On the other hand, this increase has been mostly dedicated to both out-of-pocket expenditures 
and other non-health expenditures. Spending on all out-of-pocket items was on average 
808.30 ALL in 2002 and increased to 1125.65 in 2008. The same trend is almost true for all 
the items of spending (formal payments, informal payment, transport or expenditures on 
private health care providers and drugs purchased on own initiative). Formal payments and 
payments in the health sector are two categories with the largest increase over the years. 
Formal payments per capita have increased with almost 500ALL from 2002 to 2008 (from 
767ALL to 1269ALL) while expenditures on private sector have increased with 175ALL 
over the same period (from 298ALL to 473ALL). The value of informal payments per capita 
has also increased substantially over the years from 220ALL in 2002 to 384ALL in 2008. The 
constant increase of such payments throughout the whole period demonstrates once more 
their prevailing incidence in the health sector (despite any measures taken). 
 
Table 1. Average per capita expenditures on health and non-health items (in Albanian Leks) 
Non-health 
expenditur
e quintiles 
Per capita gross 
expenditure 
(health payment 
inc) 
Per capita 
health 
expenditures 
on formal 
payments 
Per capita 
informal 
payments in 
public health 
care  
Per capita 
health 
expenditures 
on transport
Per capita 
total 
expenditures 
in private 
health sector
Overall per 
capita health 
expenditures 
Per capita net 
expenditure 
(health payments 
exc) 
YEAR 2002
Lowest 
quintile 
4296.69*** 475.14*** 121.17*** 101.82*** 144.49*** 493.94*** 3802.75*** 
2 6230.03*** 659.04 165.96 188.14 183.04*** 653.82** 5576.20*** 
3 7915.78*** 591.48*** 177.93* 128.94** 265.7 698.51* 7217.28*** 
4 10317.47*** 777.19 229.42 248.82 236.42* 780.42 9537.05*** 
Highest 
quintile 18077.70*** 1041.31*** 318.72*** 286.27* 471.78*** 1071.82*** 17005.89*** 
Total 11092.29 767.10 220.98 193.93 298.44 808.30 10284.00 
YEAR 2005
Lowest 
quintile 4394.93*** 496.82*** 152.64*** 104.60** 157.97*** 519.44*** 3875.50*** 
2 6446.95*** 639.36 278.78 128.55 179.59*** 617.97 5828.98*** 
3 8698.88*** 749.24 267.69 127.79 271.39 763.44 7935.44*** 
                                                 
1 All prices are deflated to 2002 prices. 100 ALL = 0.73 Euros in June 2002 (Bank of Albania, 2010) 
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4 11147.78** 753.25 252.24 141.84 264.33 708.37 10439.42** 
Highest 
quintile 19054.34*** 1041.77*** 348.80** 202.30* 381.92*** 902.40*** 18151.94*** 
Total 10801.00 748.55 256.89 136.39 267.80 723.05 10077.95 
YEAR 2008
Lowest 
quintile 5438.88*** 865.67* 777.96 182.29 203.18*** 849.31 4589.57*** 
2 7655.03*** 1039.79 208.58 150.78* 327.82 866.62 6788.40*** 
3 9520.95*** 972.28* 230.17 186.8 307.83* 769.02** 8751.93*** 
4 12837.11** 1494.32 426.61 288.23 727.13 1463.46 11373.65** 
Highest 
quintile 21422.69*** 1797.93* 336.94 236.36 658.98* 1520.30* 19902.39*** 
Total 11923.66 1269.22 384.54 208.19 473.96 1125.65 10798.01 
Note: Stars indicate if the mean for the particular group is significantly different from the mean of all other 
groups (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
Expenditures are given as averages for each of the categories only for those households which have actually 
spent for that particular category. 
Per capita health expenditures on formal payments include out-of-pocket expenditures on medical fees, 
laboratory works and drugs purchased in public outpatient and inpatient care (expenditures incurred in hospitals 
outside from Albania are omitted in the table).  
Informal payments include gifts paid to medical staff for public outpatient and inpatient care. 
Health expenditures in private sector include out-of-pocket expenditures on medical fees, laboratory works, 
drugs purchased and gifts to medical staff for private care. 
 
The dynamic of categories of payments over the years is also interesting. Payments 
for most of the categories, i.e. formal payments, transport or payments in private, seem to 
have decreased in real value from 2002 to 2005 while they have increased substantially in 
2008. The increase of formal payments may be due to a more aggressive policy in enforcing 
the referral system or increasing the fees paid for both outpatient and inpatient care. On the 
other side, the increased share of the private sector is more evident in 2008 causing also a 
substantial increase in the money spent in this sector. 
 
While the increase in total out-of-pocket payments in 2008 seems warring, another 
warring trend is the distribution of informal payments between quintiles of per capita 
expenditure. As it can be observed, the amount that the lowest quintiles pay informally have 
increased almost five times over the years (from 121 in 2002 to 777ALL in 2008) while this 
is accompanied by a more moderated increase in the amount paid informally by the other 
higher quintiles. The formal payments for the same quintile have almost doubled for the same 
period, demonstrating that the effects of any increase in fees are mostly transmitted to the 
lowest quintiles. 
 
Similarly to the previous table, Table 2 above shows the distribution of health and 
non-health expenditures across each of the quintiles. The table shows that generally the most 
poor, i.e. the lowest quintile, spend much more in non-direct costs, i.e. transportation or 
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informal payments, compared to the other items. Moreover, the table shows that such figures 
have increased substantially over the years for this lowest quintile. Hence, in 2008 almost 30 
per cent of all the amount of informal payments and 21 per cent of all transportation costs 
belonged to the lowest quintile (while these shares were 7 and 9 per cent respectively in 
2002).  
 
 Table 2. Financing budget shares on health and non-health items 
Non-health 
expenditure 
quintiles 
Per capita 
expenditure 
gross of 
health 
payments 
Per capita 
health 
expenditures 
on formal 
payments 
Per capita 
informal 
payments in 
health care 
Per capita 
health 
expenditures 
on transport
Per capita 
private 
expenditures 
in private 
sector 
Overall per 
capita health 
expenditures 
Per capita 
expenditure 
net of 
payments 
YEAR 2002
Lowest quintile 0.04 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.04 
2 0.08 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.14 0.07 
3 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.11 
4 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.19 0.22 0.20 
Highest quintile 0.57 0.39 0.40 0.29 0.47 0.41 0.57 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
YEAR 2005 
Lowest quintile 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.07 0.10 0.06 
2 0.11 0.17 0.23 0.21 0.12 0.16 0.11 
3 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.15 
4 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.23 
Highest quintile 0.45 0.31 0.32 0.22 0.40 0.33 0.46 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
YEAR 2008
Lowest quintile 0.08 0.13 0.30 0.21 0.08 0.13 0.08 
2 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 
3 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.16 
4 0.22 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.34 0.28 0.22 
Highest quintile 0.42 0.31 0.20 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.43 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Note: Per capita health expenditures on formal payments include out-of-pocket expenditures on medical fees, 
laboratory works and drugs purchased in public outpatient and inpatient care (expenditures incurred in hospitals 
outside from Albania are omitted in the table).  
Informal payments include gifts paid to medical staff for public outpatient and inpatient care. 
Health expenditures in private sector include out-of-pocket expenditures on medical fees, laboratory works, 
drugs purchased and gifts to medical staff for private care. 
 
 
The same could be said for other health expenditures like the formal payments or 
private costs which have increased to 13 per cent respectively for this quintile. Unfortunately, 
this increase in the relative shares of out-of-pocket payments has not been accompanied by a 
similar increase in the relative per capita non-health expenditure (which has only increased 
from 4 to 8 per cent for the poorest quintile). This shows again that policy measures through 
2002 and 2008 have had a negative impact on the poorest quintiles. In 2008 the poorest 
households have on (average) relatively less budget than the rich if compared to 2002, but 
they face higher out-of-pocket payments. The dramatic increase in non-direct health care 
costs demonstrates that these people now face more barriers to health care than before. 
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Catastrophic payments in health care in Albania 
 
When total expenditure is used as the denominator the most common threshold 
employed in the literature to measure catastrophic spending is 10 percent – the threshold at 
which prior research has found households can be forced to sacrifice basic necessities 
(Pradhan and Prescott, 2002; Rason, 2002; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003).  Table 3 
presents alternative measures out-of-pocket payments for health care for each quintile of 
household non-health expenditure, over the three waves of the ALSMS. The headcount 
(incidence) in this table is the share of individuals for whom the proportion of out-of-pocket 
payments for health (shown as a percentage of total spending), exceeds a number of set 
thresholds, ranging from 5 per cent to 25 per cent.  In 2002 22.6 per cent of the population 
paid health care out-of-pocket costs that exceeded 10 per cent of their total per capita budget.  
Encouragingly, this incidence declined to 17.6 per cent in 2005, and further to 13.3 in 2008.  
The largest drop occurred between 2005 and 2008 and may be related to the general fall in 
poverty during that period (INSTAT, 2009).  However, as observed previously, households in 
the lowest quintile seemed to have suffered the most from catastrophic payments (according 
to this threshold) throughout the period of analysis.  The share of individuals in the lowest 
quintiles paying more than 10 per cent of their total expenditures for out-of pocket health care 
was about 29-30 per cent in 2002 and 2005 and only decreased to 20 per cent in 2008. 
 
Table 3. Incidence and intensity of catastrophic health payments defined with respect to total 
expenditure 
CATASTROPHIC PAYMENTS 
MEASURES 
THRESHOLD BUDGET SHARE 
Thresh. 5% Thresh. 10% Thresh. 15% Thresh. 25% 
YEAR 2002 
Headcount (H)     
Lowest non-health 
expenditure quintile 45.2 29.9 20.6 12.2 
2 41.1 26.7 18.2 8.9 
3 37.2 24.1 15.1 8.6 
4 33.8 20.6 13.4 6.5 
Highest non-health 
expenditure quintile 25.3 11.7 7.3 4.1 
Total 36.5 22.6 14.9 8.1 
Overshoot (O) 5.4 4.0 3.1 2.0 
Mean positive overshoot 
(MPO) 45.2 29.9 20.6 12.2 
YEAR 2005 
Headcount (H)     
Lowest non-health 
expenditure quintile 42.9 28.7 20.6 13.2 
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2 39.1 22.3 14.4 5.8 
3 33.6 18.5 12.8 6.4 
4 25.6 11.8 6.7 2.8 
Highest non-health 
expenditure quintile 17.2 6.8 3.5 1.7 
Total 31.6 17.6 11.6 6.0 
Overshoot (O) 3.9 2.7 2.0 1.2 
Mean positive overshoot 
(MPO) 12.4 15.6 17.4 19.9 
YEAR 2008 
Headcount (H)     
Lowest non-health 
expenditure quintile 28.9 20.0 13.8 10.0 
2 25.0 14.8 10.7 6.3 
3 22.4 12.0 7.9 4.5 
4 20.1 11.3 7.9 3.5 
Highest non-health 
expenditure quintile 15.9 8.4 5.0 2.9 
Total 22.5 13.3 9.1 5.4 
Overshoot (O) 5.0 4.1 3.5 2.8 
Mean positive overshoot 
(MPO) 22.1 30.8 38.9 52.2 
 
The second part of Table 3 gives also information on the measures of catastrophic 
overshoot for each of the years. This measure represents the average extent by which health 
care expenditure (as a proportion of total non-health expenditure) exceeds the respective 
threshold. In other words it measures the intensity of catastrophic out-of-pocket payments. 
This is important as it complements the headcount measure of catastrophic payments (the 
incidence). The table shows that the intensity of catastrophic payments drops as the threshold 
is raised from 5 to 25 per cent of total non-health expenditure throughout all years. The mean 
positive overshoot on the other hand gives an idea of the average spending on out-of-pocket 
for all those exceeding the threshold. Hence, we observe that households spending more than 
10 per cent of their expenditures on out-of-pocket spend on average 39.9 per cent in out-of-
pocket in 2002, 25.6 per cent in 2005 and 40.8 per cent in 2008.2 As these numbers show the 
average out-of-pocket amount paid as a share of total non-health expenditure has increased 
sharply over the period 2005 and 2008. This reinforces our previous finding regarding the 
dramatic increase in certain categories of health care expenditure like the formal payments 
and the expenditures on private health care.  
The impoverishing impact of out-of-pocket expenditures in Albania 
 
                                                 
2 The average out-of-pocket payment as a ratio of total expenditures for households exceeding a certain 
threshold is given as the sum of the threshold and MPO (Z+MPO). For example in 2002 for the 10 % threshold 
the average amount spent from those exceeding the threshold is 10%+ 29.9%=39.9%. 
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Most societies care if the households paying catastrophic out-of-pocket payments 
belong to the poorest quintiles rather than the richest ones. The concentration index CE 
displayed in Table 4 can estimate such effect. A positive value of such concentration index 
shows that the better-off households have a greater tendency to fall into catastrophic 
payments and a negative value shows a greater tendency among the poorest. As we can see 
from the table in fact at every threshold we choose over the years, the poorest have a greater 
tendency to fall into catastrophic payments.  
 
Table 4. Distribution-sensitive catastrophic payments measures – concentration index 
CONCENTRATION INDEX, 
CE 
THRESHOLD BUDGET SHARE 
Thresh. 5% Thresh . 10% Thresh . 15% Thresh . 25% 
Year 2002 -0.114 -0.161 -0.182 -0.201 
Year 2005 -0.168 -0.257 -0.299 -0.364 
Year 2008 -0.121 -0.178 -0.207 -0.278 
 
Table 5 shows that out-of-pocket health expenditures have increased the percentage of 
the poor Albanian households. The poverty headcount has decreased from 2002 to 2008, but 
the post-payment poverty headcount are much higher if considering out-of-pocket 
expenditures for health care. Poverty increases by 6.49 percentage points in 2002, by 4.34 in 
2005 and by 3.61 in 2008. The poverty gap after payments has consistently been higher than 
the pre-payment one during all analysed years. The percent point impact for the poverty gap 
has increased from 189.24 in 2002 to 185.93 in 2008 showing the significant increase in 
inequalities due to out-of-pocket payments. 
 
Table 5. Measures of poverty based on per capita expenditure gross and net of spending for 
health care.  
 POVERTY 
HEADCOUNT 
POVERTY 
GAP 
NORMALISED 
POVERTY GAP 
NORMALISED MEAN 
POSITIVE POVERTY 
GAP 
YEAR 2002
Pre-payment headcount 26.58 300.25 6.14 23.10 
Post-payment headcount 33.07 489.49 10.01 30.26 
Poverty impact- percentage 
point change 6.49 189.24 3.87 7.17 
Percentage change 24.42 63.03 63.03 31.03 
YEAR 2005 
Pre-payment headcount 19.45 215.71 4.41 22.68 
Post-payment headcount 23.79 336.57 6.88 28.92 
Poverty impact- percentage 
point change 4.34 120.86 2.47 6.25 
Percentage change 22.33 56.03 56.03 27.54 
YEAR 2008 
Pre-payment headcount 12.19 110.18 2.25 18.47 
Post-payment headcount 15.80 296.11 6.05 38.31 
Poverty impact- percentage 3.61 185.93 3.80 19.84 
 12
point change 
Percentage change 29.60 168.75 168.75 107.38 
 
The catastrophic impact that out-of pocket expenditures have on households can be 
seen visually in Figure 1. The graphs are based on Jan Pen’s parade of “dwarfs and a few 
giants” (see also Cowell, 1995; O’Donell et al., 2008) and give the impact of health care 
expenditures by plotting household expenditures gross and net of total out-of-pocket 
payments. The x-axis represents the cumulative proportion of households ranked by their 
total expenditures and y-axis gives the level of total expenditures and out-of-pocket payments 
in Albanian Leks. The two moments are represented by the pre and post expenditure per 
capita and are compared against the food poverty line (the horizontal line) that amounts to 
3047ALL per capita. The drops in the expenditure levels are given by the vertical bars (which 
represent the exact amount of health care expenditures per capita). All graphs show that there 
are many households whose expenditures fall below the extreme poverty line if we assume 
that they forego other consumption for health care. Such effects are not only observed for the 
lowest quintiles but also for all the others. Out-of-pocket health expenditures tend to be 
higher for the higher quintiles (see Table 1) and when they are not insured they may drive 
also such quintiles in poverty. Graph (c) in Figure 1 shows that for 2008 catastrophic health 
care expenditures tend to be more severe for certain households. This is due to the increase in 
private health care expenditures and also the rise of formal payments. Such increases can be 
problematic even for the highest quintiles and show that can be problematic in the long-run if 
no forms of insurance are taken against them. 
 
Figure 1. Poverty impact of health expenditure on the distribution of non-health expenditure 
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a) Year 2002 
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b) Year 2005 
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c) Year 2008 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
The weak role of national health insurance in Albania, especially for inpatient care 
exposes households to the financial risks associated with accidents and sickness.  A large 
share of the health services have to be paid for out-of-pocket, sometimes up front at the point 
of service. Such payments include formal and informal payments to medical staff. Health 
insurance in Albania should cover most of the formal costs of primary health care and all the 
costs of hospital care. Patients are formally required to pay small, fixed co-payments per visit 
in PHC or for specialised treatments in hospital care. However, evidence from ALSMSs 
show that until 2008 the amounts reported as formal out-of-pocket payments remained high. 
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This leads to believe that a large share of such payments is very likely to be defined as 
informal payments if a broader definition is employed.3  
 
The analysis of the trends of out-of-pocket payments over the different years in Albania 
has shown that they have increased in real value from 2002 to 2008. The increase has not 
been the same for all the categories and expenditure quintiles. Formal/informal payments and 
expenditure in the private sector have increased significantly from 2002 to 2008 while 
expenditure on transport has remained more or less stable. The data show that the poorest 
households remain the most financially vulnerable to the cost of health care. Generally the 
poorest people (in households in the lowest expenditure quintile) spend much more in non-
direct health costs, i.e. transportation or informal payments, when compared with other items.  
This category of spending has also increased substantially over the years for households in 
the lowest quintile. The catastrophic headcounts for all thresholds show that out-of-pocket 
spending may lead to catastrophic health care expenditures in Albania. Considering a 10 
percent threshold of total per capita expenditures these numbers are 22.6 per cent in 2002, 
17.6 in 2005 and 13.3 in 2008. But eventhough catastrophic payments have declined 
substantially over the years, the decline for the poorest quintiles has not been in the same 
range remaining to 20.0 per cent in 2008.  
 
Moreover, out-of-pocket health expenditures can contribute to poverty among Albanian 
households. Both poverty rates and poverty gaps after the occurrence of out-of-pocket 
expenditure for health become higher. This demonstrates for an increase risk of falling in 
poverty or extreme poverty among health care seekers. Such issues may also be more serious 
as we expect an underestimation of the figures presented here for the lower end of the income 
distribution. Generally these people face higher obstacles and financial constraints when 
seeking health care and therefore are more likely to not seek it at all.  
 
Overall, the results show that Albanian authority should consider more seriously the 
reduction of out-of-pocket payments through ensuring the effectiveness of prepaying 
mechanisms for health care. The impoverishing effects of such payments call for more 
attention from the policy makers. One of the possible interventions recommended would be 
revising the structure of user fees so that it reflects the income distribution (as the poor seem 
                                                 
3 Payments for health care or medicals that otherwise should have been provided free are also consider informal 
payments. 
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more likely to suffer the effects). This would include reinforcing fee exemptions for 
vulnerable groups (e.g. unemployed, recipients of social assistance, pregnant women, the 
disabled, people suffering severe illnesses, etc). Another potential policy measures are also 
price subsidies which have proven effective in reducing catastrophic payments in other 
countries (Pradhan and Prescott, 2002). Giving that particular items like informal payments 
or transportation costs have a significant contribution in overall out-of-pocket expenditures, 
the government should also have clear policies in addressing them. While informal payments 
are more difficult to address (as they require integrated measures dealing with governance, 
accountability and availability of resources), transportation costs may be cut down more 
easily through measures like subsidised transportation for the poor or simply a better 
distribution of health care centres. 
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Appendix      
 
Table A1. Incidence and intensity of catastrophic health payments defined with respect to 
total non-food expenditure 
CATASTROPHIC 
PAYMENTS MEASURES 
THRESHOLD BUDGET SHARE 
Thresh. 5% Thresh. 10% Thresh. 15% Thresh. 25% Thresh. 40%
YEAR 2002 
Headcount (H)      
Lowest non-health 
expenditure quintile 45.2 29.9 20.6 12.2 5.5 
2 41.1 26.7 18.2 8.9 4.4 
3 37.2 24.1 15.1 8.6 3.4 
4 33.8 20.6 13.4 6.5 3.8 
Highest non-health 
expenditure quintile 25.3 11.7 7.3 4.1 1.4 
Total 36.5 22.6 14.9 8.1 3.7 
Overshoot (O) 5.4 4.0 3.1 2.0 1.2 
Mean positive overshoot 
(MPO) 14.9 17.6 20.6 24.7 31.4 
YEAR 2005 
Headcount (H)      
Lowest non-health 
expenditure quintile 60.8 49.1 43.9 31.6 22.1 
2 54.7 43.7 36.1 28.3 15.8 
3 48.5 38.7 31.3 20.9 12.1 
4 44.6 30.4 22.3 13.6 6.0 
Highest non-health 
expenditure quintile 33.0 21.6 14.7 8.0 4.5 
Total 48.3 36.7 29.6 20.5 12.1 
Overshoot (O) 17.2 15.1 13.4 11.0 8.6 
Mean positive overshoot 
(MPO) 35.6 41.1 45.3 53.5 70.7 
YEAR 2008 
Headcount (H)      
Lowest non-health 
expenditure quintile 42.9 33.0 29.3 21.3 16.8 
2 41.1 31.5 24.7 17.6 13.0 
3 34.0 27.4 22.2 15.2 8.9 
4 35.4 25.8 19.7 13.2 7.1 
Highest non-health 
expenditure quintile 26.1 19.3 14.4 8.8 5.2 
Total 35.9 27.4 22.0 15.2 10.2 
Overshoot (O) 17.0 15.5 14.3 12.5 10.6 
Mean positive overshoot 
(MPO) 47.5 56.5 64.8 81.9 103.8 
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